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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant / Cross-Appellee,
Case No. 20090279-CA

vs.
JAMES BENJAMIN WHITE,
Appellee / Cross-Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appeals an order dismissing with prejudice one count of Criminal
Nonsupport, a third degree felony. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2009 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Is the appeal or cross-appeal in this case jurisdictionally proper and did the

State fail to preserve its issue on appeal? Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.
State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, 203 P.3d 984.
2.

Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion and dismiss this almost

nine-year old case in accordance with Rule 25, Utah R. Crim. P. 25, which allows a case
to be dismissed "for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice." Cf. State v. Killpack,
191 P.3d 17 (Utah 2008) ("[U]nder an abuse of discretion standard, [we] will overturn a
sentencing decision only if it is " ' clear that the actions of the [trial] judge were so
1

inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.'"); Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v.
Hardy, 2008 UT 15, f 9 ("A court's interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear
abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great deference.").
3.

For analogous reasons, did the trial court appropriately dismiss this case due

to speedy trial violations and the evidentiary difficulties attached to fifteen-year old
factual allegations and an almost nine-year old prosecution filing? See supra Issue 2.
4.

Did the trial court's ruling appropriately consider the language of the

competency statute and, assuming, arguendo, error existed, did the State fail to meet its
burden of showing that prejudicial error occurred?
An erroneous decision by a trial court "cannot result in reversible error
unless the error is harmful." Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome
of the proceedings. Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the
verdict. The burden of showing harmfulness normally rests with the complaining
party.
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah, 1997) (citations omitted); id. (citing State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988) (holding that "appellant has the burden of
establishing that reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion").
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. White disputes the State's argument that its issue was preserved. See Point II.
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STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of the following relevant statutory provisions and rules are contained in
this brief or Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5

Utah R. Civ. P. 59

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6

Utah R. Crim. P. 25

Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-1
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In its opening brief, the State's "Statement of the Case" appears to list the pertinent
dates or filings at the trial court level. Mr. White does not repeat them here, although the
statement is supplemented or clarified below in his brief.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Due to the long-standing nature of this almost nine-year old case, the trial court set
forth in detail its reasons for finding Mr. White to be incompetent, albeit the incompetent
determination was not disputed below nor on appeal. The court's two written rulings are
attached in the Addenda, with relevant procedural facts noted in the Statement of the Case
of the State's Opening Brief or below in the body of this brief. See State of Utah v. James
Benjamin White, Case No. 011900818, "Ruling and Order," dated March 24, 2009 (a
copy of which is attached as Addendum B); R 1033-49; State of Utah v. James Benjamin
White, Case No. 011900818, "Ruling on State's Motion to Amend Judgment," dated
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April 14, 2009 (a copy of which is attached as Addendum C).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State's is not jurisdictional^ barred from appealing the lower court's order of
dismissal. However, Mr. White's pro se cross-appeal appears to be improper because
there is no pending prosecution.
The State attempted to preserve its issue with a pleading entitled, "Motion to alter
or amend judgment," although its reliance on and citation to Rule 59 is inapposite to the
facts at hand. The State did not follow the requirements of the Rule and it essentially
filed a motion to reconsider - a pleading not recognized under Utah rules or her authority.
Rule 25 allowed the lower court to dismiss a case involving fifteen year old factual
allegations after it had presided over the matter for almost nine years and determined that
Mr. White was incompetent to proceed. "In its discretion, for substantial cause, and in
furtherance of justice," the court weighed the competing interests of the parties before
ruling that the unreasonable delays would result in an unfair trial. Its order(s) may be
affirmed on that basis.
For analogous reasons, Mr. White's constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated and, as noted by the court, he would suffer the prejudice of an unfair trial had his
matter proceeded forward.
The State does not contest the lower court's finding of incompetence. Its
challenge to the commitment procedure of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1) is subject to

4

whatever may have been provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5. Since the
court's order(s) constitute an exception to the Section -(6)(1) commitment procedure, the
statutory mandate would be inapplicable to this particular case.
Assuming, arguendo, a statutory requirement of placing the defendant in
restorative treatment for 90 days was not followed, the error was harmless. The State has
not shown the likelihood of a different outcome with such a placement, particularly since
the trial court explained that its result would not be any different. It had presided over the
matter for approximately eight or nine years and a further review, after an additional 90
days, would not have made a difference. Moreover, in its oral ruling and in both of its
written rulings, the court repeated that it had reviewed and considered the entire
commitment and competency statute. At its hearing, the court provided the parties with a
copy of the statute for reference. Lack of prejudice is further evidenced by the State's
ability to refile additional charges and to pursue civil commitment proceedings if it
desires treatment for Mr. White. This Court should affirm the lower court rulings.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPEARS TO EXIST FOR
THE STATE. BUT NOT FOR THE DEFENDANT'S PRO SE APPEAL
Mr. White's pro se arguments in his cross-appeal appear to be jurisdictionally
impermissible. Under the statute that governs appeals, a defendant has the right to appeal
only a few limited orders - none of which apply to his situation. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-18a-l(l)(a) ("a final judgment of conviction"); -1(1 )(b) ("an order made after
judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant"); -l(l)(c) ("an order
adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending prosecution"); 1(1 )(d) ("an order denying bail"). In light of the lower court's order of dismissal, the
prosecution is no longer pending and the defendant may not file a cross-appeal.
However, the State takes a different view in its brief, believing that the same
language entitled it to appeal "an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to
proceed further in a pending prosecution." State's Opening Brief, page 4 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(c)).1 Less problematic than the "pending prosecution" language
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(c) or -l(3)(c) would have been a statutory provision
that simply allowed either party to appeal from "an order adjudicating the defendant's
competency to proceed further." Since the "pending prosecution" words may not be
deemed superfluous statutory language, the right to appeal does not exist (for either party)

1

Assuming, arguendo, this Court sides with the State in its reading of subsection -l(3)(c), Mr.
White's/?ro se arguments are attached in Addendum D of this brief without editing or alteration.

6

if the case was dismissed. There is no pending prosecution.
Despite the absence of a right for the State to appeal under the "pending
prosecution" clause of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(3)(c), a companion clause gave the
State the ability to appeal from "a final judgment of dismissal." Utah Code Ann. § 7718a-l(3)(a). On the one hand, because a specific provision governs over a general
provision, the inability to appeal from "an order adjudicating the defendant's competency
to proceed further in a pending prosecution" would trump the general allowance to appeal
from "a final judgment of dismissal." On the other hand and to be consistent, if the
"pending prosecution" clause is so specific as to be inapplicable, the right to appeal from
"afinaljudgment of dismissal" must be conceded.
POINT II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED
The State argues that "[t]his issue was preserved below in the State's motion to
alter or amend judgment, R. 1055-70,1123-28, and is therefore properly before this
Court." Appellant's brief, page 1. Contrary to its argument, however, the State's cited
authority, Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) and (7), is inapposite to the trial court's ruling because
there was never a trial. R 1055. Further, this Court need not recognize the substance of
the State's motion due to the nature of the unrecognized pleading.
At the trial level, "pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) and (7)[J ...
[the State asked] the court to open the judgment and direct entry of a new judgment when:
there is insufficient evidence to justify the decision; or the decision is against the law; or
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there is an error in law." See State of Utah v. James Benjamin White, Trial Case No.
011900818, "Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment," page 1 (filed April 2, 2009); R 1055.
Claiming "[i]t is appropriate for the Court to utilize this civil procedure rule in an
instance, such as this, where there is no applicable criminal statute or rule[,]" R 1068, the
State improperly relied on an inapplicable rule of procedure for its motion.
Rule 59 is a post-trial rule of procedure that has nothing to do with Judge
Boyden's pre-trial order of dismissal. The grounds for Rule 59 are inapposite here,2 as
are the context of the accompanying subsections of the Rule - all of which encompass
post-trial issues like misconduct of the jury, newly discovered evidence, or excessive or
inadequate damages. Indeed, the predicate for a Rule 59 motion are mandatory affidavits
which were glaringly absent from the State's motion and buttress the misapplication of
the Rule to this situation. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c).
The State's attempt to rely on broad language such as an "error in law" or "it is
against the law," Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) & (7), does not save the motion because of the
lack of a trial below, the lack of affidavits in support of its motion, and the lack of plain
2

Subsection (a), entitled "Grounds," states:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:

Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a).
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language in support of its claims for the case at bar. In fact, the State's own motion does
not even cite subsection (e), which is the specific Rule provision governing a "Motion to
alter or amend a judgment." Compare R 1055 with Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e).
What the State appears to have filed is a motion to reconsider. Believing the trial
court legally erred, R 1055; Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) & (7), the State tried to change the
ruling with the filed motion notwithstanding the court's detailed sixteen page Ruling and
Order. R 1033-1049. Motions to reconsider are more than disfavored, "they are not
recognized by our rules" and the State's substantively similar "Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment," R 1055, should be similarly rejected by this Court.
Just as the rules do not recognize a motion to reconsider as a basis for tolling the
time for an appeal, the State's deficient pleading here should not be recognized as a basis
for preserving an issue on appeal. Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ^ 7, 135 P.3d 861
(holding "regardless of the motion's substance, postjudgment motions to reconsider and
other similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because they are not
recognized by our rules"); Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,1f
21, 89 P.3d 155 ("an appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper
grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground"). As a reminder, had
the State's "Motion to Alter or Amend" been used as the date for filing its notice of
appeal, the entire pleading would not have been recognized regardless of its substantive
content. Gillett, 2006 UT 24.

9

An appropriate course of action would have been for "the prosecutor [to inform]
the court that commitment proceedings pursuant to Title 62 A, Chapter 5, Services to
People with Disabilities, or Title 62A, Chapter 15, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Act, will be initiated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(5)(c).
POINT III. RULE 25 ALLOWS THE COURT, "IN ITS DISCRETION. FOR
SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE AND IN FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE." TO
DISMISS THE INFORMATION
The State disagreed with the lower court's "Ruling and Order," dated March 24,
2009 (hereinafter "First Ruling"), and the court's subsequent "Ruling on State's Motion
to Amend Judgment," dated April 14, 2009 (hereinafter "Second Ruling"), yet the State
did not attach either ruling for appellate review, Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted) ("If an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on
appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below"), nor did it fully
set forth the court's rationale, carefully considered and weighed under a totality of the
circumstances analysis. The court's sixteen page and five page rulings did not ignore the
lawful requirements. R 1033-49; 1123-28,
The First Ruling and Second Ruling of the trial court, both of which confirmed the
dismissal of Mr. White's case without the need for trial, were consistent with the court's
discretionary powers under Rule 25. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) (entitled, "Dismissal
without trial").
Under the Rule, "In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of
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justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order
an information or indictment dismissed." More specifically, "The court shall dismiss the
information or indictment when ... [t]here is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in
bringing defendant to trial[.]" Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1). Although not specifically cited,
the court's order of dismissal was in accordance with the rule. Utah R. Crim. P. 25(c);
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, \ 21, 89 P.3d 155 ("an
appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the
trial court relied on some other ground").
As discussed by the court, the order dismissing the case was not a rash or
impetuous decision. A small excerpt from the court's First Ruling is summarized below,
albeit a more complete reading of the attached written order provides greater context and
an explanation of the circumstances at hand:
The defendant is beyond litigious or obstreperous. The evidence outlined in
this ruling far exceeds the standard of preponderance.
Defendant is absolutely incompetent to proceed to trial on the criminal nonsupport charge, dated 1994-2000.
Upon an adjudication that a defendant is not competent to proceed, § 77-156, Utah Code Ann., directs the procedure to restore competency. It addresses cases
where medication and treatment at the State Hospital are likely to be beneficial.
It specifically states that defendants charged with Aggravated Murder,
Murder, Attempted Murder, Manslaughter and other first degree felonies should
have priority to these resources.
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Certainly the State has a real interest in prosecuting criminal non-support
cases. But as a third degree felony property charge, it carries less weight.
There is no indication in this case that defendant would cooperate with
treatment outside the State Hospital, that treatment would be beneficial, or that
restoration to competency is likely. There is no reason to think any restoration
could occur in a reasonable period of time.
The controlling statute is clear that defendant's non-compliance is not a
basis for dismissal. But my responsibility as Judge requires I weigh all applicable
factors.
The allegations in this case are nine to fifteen years old. The evidence is
sufficiently stale that neither party is likely to get a fair trial. The minor children
are approaching majority. There is no likelihood that restitution ever would be
paid, even if defendant were tried and convicted.
There simply are not sufficient interests to justify expending any more
resources on this case or allowing it to proceed any further.
First Ruling, pages 14-15; R i l l 1-12 (attached as AddendumB); see also R 1142 (the
court's written First Ruling was based on its oral ruling, announced March 23, 2009).
In response to the State's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the court's Second
Ruling further expounded upon its reasoning and included the lack of prejudice to the
State and the government's ability to refile additional charges.
The State argues that upon my adjudication that defendant was not
competent to proceed, I ignored the Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-6, requirement to
commit the defendant to the custody of the executive director of the Department of
Human Resources for treatment intended to restore his competency. The State
feels that because I did not have the benefit of these additional evaluations, my
ruling was premature and without sufficient basis.
12

Neither is correct. As outlined in detail in both my oral and written
decisions from the March 23, 2009 hearing, this Court considered years of
observations and volumes of evidence before reaching the competency
adjudication. The State does not contest that determination.
Upon that adjudication, I did not blindly or routinely proceed to the initial
next-step of committing defendant to the Department of Human Resources,
without any more consideration. Instead, I exercised my proper judicial role and
considered the entire restorative process described in § 77-15-6. I weighed the
judicious expenditure of those extensive resources against the totality of the
circumstances in the pending case. Those circumstances include the factor that the
allegations in this case are 15 years old, with the attendant evidentiary issues.
If I had made the commitment requested by the State, the evidence is
abundant that the defendant would not have complied with my order to cooperate
with the director of Human Resources any more than he has complied with any of
my previous orders.
Defendant's previous conduct and statements indicate the most compulsive
services; including police power, incarceration, State hospital commitment and
involuntary medication, would likely be required to obtain defendant's cooperation
in an attempt to restore competency. Even, if for the sake of argument, defendant
were to freely cooperate and be fully restored to competency within the initial sixmonth treatment phase; I had already ruled that the reasonable time frame for this
old case to be fairly tried, is already past. The State does not indicate who would
bear the cost of the full process they demand. But it is proper for the Court to
determine the appropriateness of this use of resources.
I rendered the Judgment the State seeks to amend only AFTER weighing all
the factors clearly outlined in my ruling. I considered them along with defendant's
extensive history of noncompliance and the evidentiary issues raised by the age of
the case. ONLY THEN did I determine that the likelihood of the State obtaining
the remedy they seek on the pending allegations did not warrant the expenditure of
all the resources outlines in § 77-15-6. Therefore I dismissed the pending
allegations ONLY.
13

... [My ruling] does not preclude the State from screening and appropriately
pursuing more recent charges.

In fact, my ruling affords the State an opportunity to pursue more recent
charges, if appropriate, with fresher evidence, more accessible records, more
readily available witnesses, and negates the possibility of reversal on defendant's
180-day Detainer Motion from 2001.
Second Ruling, pages 2-4 (a copy of which is attached in Addendum C); R 1124-26
(emphasis in original).
The court's First and Second Ruling supported its exercise of discretion and
allowed a dismissal without trial. See Utah R. Crim. P. 25. The order of dismissal was
pursuant to "substantial cause and in furtherance of justice[.]" Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a).
This Court may affirm the lower court ruling on that basis.
Indeed, consistent with Rule 25fs mandate to "dismiss the information or
indictment when ... [t]here is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant
to trial[,]" Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1), is a dismissal based on a speedy trial violation. U.S.
Const, amend VI. A separate but related analysis follows.
POINT IV. MR. WHITE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
WAS VIOLATED
Because there has been an unconstitutional delay of almost eight years before Mr.
White was determined incompetent to stand trial, this case should be dismissed with
prejudice. Under Utah law, an "[unconstitutional delay occurs when a defendant's
fundamental right to a speedy trial has been violated." State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App
14

215, ^f 25, 138 P.3d 97. In order to determine whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial has been violated, the U.S. Supreme Court has enumerated four
relevant factors to consider. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Specifically,
these factors are "(1) the '[l]ength of delay,' (2) 'the reason for the delay.' (3) 'the
defendant's assertion of his right [to a speedy trial],' and (4) the 'prejudice to the
defendant.'" Cornjo, 2006 UT App 215 at Tf 26 {quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
However, none of these factors is "a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Barker, 407 U.S.
at 533.
An analysis of these factors and the circumstances of this case indicate that Mr.
White's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, and therefore this Court
should affirm the trial court's dismissal. Further, in light of the lower court's order of
dismissal and its reference to the prejudicial delays, the State on appeal should be saddled
with the burden of establishing that these factors do not apply.
A.

The Length of Delay in This Case is Presumptively Prejudicial and
Sufficient to Trigger a Speedy Trial Analysis Because It is Not
Justified by the Complexity or Seriousness of the Case.

Because the length of the delay is not justified by the complexity or seriousness of
the case, it is presumptively prejudicial and therefore sufficient to trigger a speedy trial
analysis. As this Court explained in Cornejo, "a determination of what constitutes a
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'presumptively prejudicial' delay 'is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case.' For example, for 'serious, [more] complex' crimes, a greater
period of delay will be tolerated." 2006 UT App 215 at |27 {quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at
530-31); see also State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 (Utah 1989) (noting that "the length
of delay that can be tolerated is proportional to the complexity of the case.").
For instance, in State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 670 (Utah 1997), the Utah
Supreme Court considered a delay of three years and one month in the prosecution of first
and third degree felonies to be substantial "enough to trigger a threshold speedy trial
inquiry," noting that this amount of time was "potentially, but not necessarily, prejudicial"
without a consideration of the other relevant factors. Additionally, in State v. Snyder, 932
P.2d 120, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), a delay of one year and eight months in the
prosecution of a class A misdemeanor was sufficient enough to trigger a speedy trial
analysis.
Here, the delay of almost eight years in the prosecution of a third degree felony
criminal non-support charge is certainly lengthy enough for a speedy trial analysis.
Moreover, neither the complexity nor the seriousness of the charges in this case justifies
such a delay. Accordingly, the length of the delay "is sufficient to raise legitimate
questions regarding [Mr. White's] right to a speedy disposition" of his case and warrants
a consideration of the Barker factors. State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385-86 (Utah
1986).
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B.

Mr. White Has Not Waived His Right to a Speedy Trial Because He
Has Requested and Demanded a Speedy Trial on Numerous
Occasions Throughout the Criminal Proceeding.

Although Barker requires the court to consider whether the defendant asserted his
right to a speedy trial, the Supreme Court "made it clear that a defendant cannot waive his
right to a speedy trial by failing to demand it." State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah
1987); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 528. Instead, the Court explained that "the better rule
is that the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of
the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right... [This] allows
the trial court to exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances." Barker, 407
U.S. at 528-29.
The record in this case is replete with demands and requests made by Mr. White
for a speedy trial. R. 17-18,29-35,70-74, 116-117,132-133, 152-154,201-207,332,
346-355, 607-651, 1126. Thus, the third Barker factor is undoubtedly satisfied.
C.

Mr. White Will Suffer Prejudice in This Case Because the Delay of
Nearly Eight Years Awaiting a Jury Trial Will Impede the
Preparation of an Adequate Defense

Barker requires a consideration of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a
result of the delay, which the Supreme Court explained "should be assessed in light of the
interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect." Barker, 407
U.S. at 532. Specifically, the right to a speedy trial was intended "(i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
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(iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired'" Id. (emphasis added).
The first of these factors is inapplicable in this case because Mr. White is not
presently incarcerated. However, as the Court noted in Barker, "even if an accused in not
incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by the restraints on his liberty and by
living under a cloud of anxiety." Id. at 533.
More significantly, however, Mr. White will suffer prejudice from the delay in this
case because of the likelihood that his defense will be impaired as result. In cases
involving significant delay, "prejudice may fairly be presumed simply because everyone
knows that memories fade, evidence is lost, and the burden of anxiety upon any criminal
defendant increases with the passing months and years." U.S. v. Mann, 291 F.Supp. 268,
271 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (cited with approval in Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
Notably, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that "affirmative proof of
particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim." Doggett, 505 U.S. at
655. In fact, the Court specifically "recognized that impairment of one's defense is the
most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of
exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.'" Id. (quoting Barker, 407
U.S. at 532). For that reason, "excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability
of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify." Id.
Additionally, the importance of such presumptive prejudice "increases with the length of
delay." Id. at 656.
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Accordingly, Mr. White need not demonstrate affirmative proof of particularized
prejudice in order to prevail on his speedy trial claim; rather, as the trial court noted,
prejudice may fairly be presumed in this case because of the likelihood that Mr. White's
defense will be impaired as a result of a delay of nearly eight years awaiting trial. Thus,
even if Mr. White's competency was a non-issue, his ability to present an adequate
defense at an eventual jury trial was severely compromised by the delays. R 1047 (the
lower court explained, "[t]he allegations in this case are nine to fifteen years told [and
the] evidence is sufficiently stale that neither party is likely to get a fair trial"). Even in a
best case scenario of Mr. White attaining competency in the immediate future, the
unfairness of a trial proceeding continues to be hindered by the passage of time. In sum,
dismissal of the charge is appropriate based on a violation of Mr. White's right to a
speedy trial.
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY REVIEWED AND
CONSIDERED THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
"[T]he State has chosen to not appeal from the court's determination that
Defendant is incompetent." State's Opening Brief, page 5. In its appeal of the court's
order dismissing the case, the State contends as follows:
Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-6(1) (West 2004) requires the trial court to give the
Department of Human Services an opportunity to restore the defendant to
competency prior to taking any action with respect to the charges:
Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found to
be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant committed
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to the custody of the executive director of the Department of Human
Services or his designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the
defendant to competency.
State's Opening Brief, page 6 (citing Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-6(1)) (emphasis
added by the State).
The State's cited statutory quote is incomplete, however, as it omitted a key
sentence. After the sentence ending with "to restore the defendant to competency[,]" the
very next sentence reads, "The court may recommend but not order placement of the
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1). In other words, "[t]he court may ... not order
placement of the defendant." Id. If there is not court ordered placement, the DHS
director or designee need not designate specific placement of the defendant:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found to be
incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant committed to the
custody of the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his
designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant to
competency. The court may recommend but not order placement of the
defendant. The court may, however, order that the defendant be placed in a
secure setting rather than a nonsecure setting. The director or his designee shall
designate the specific placement of the defendant during the period of evaluation
and treatment to restore competency.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1) (emphasis added).
The first clause of the above indented paragraph, "Except as provided in
Subsection (5)," also merits attention as the clause provides an exception to the general
rule. The State's claimed mandatory requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1) is
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subject to whatever may have been provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5.
Significantly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 allowed the court to "make any
reasonable order to insure compliance with this section." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(14).
The court here made such an order. The State did not then, nor does it now, contend that
the court's order and finding of Mr. White's incompetence was unreasonable or
insufficient under the preponderance of evidence standard. Nor did the State attempt
substantively to counter the trial court's belief that there were insufficient interests
justifying further prosecution or that DHS efforts would ultimately be unsuccessful. See
State's Opening Brief, page 8. For each basis, the court's order was not attacked as
substantively unreasonable. Rather, the State's issue was a claimed procedural mistake of
not allowing a 90 day restorative effort for a case that had been pending for nine years.
Regardless of the State's focus, the court's reasonable order under Utah Code Ann. § 7715-5(14) negated any requirement under Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1).
POINT VI. IF THE COURT ERRED BY NOT FOLLOWING THE STATUTE.
THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS
In other competency proceedings, the issue of procedural punctuality or statutory
noncompliance has surfaced before. For example, in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219
(Utah, 1997), the defendant procedurally challenged the trial court's decision to hold a
hearing too early and for not formally staying the proceedings in accordance with the
mandatory language of the statute. Although the opinion found error, such a procedural
error and lack of statutory compliance was deemed harmless:
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However, having determined that error was committed, we must address its
harmfulness. An erroneous decision by a trial court "cannot result in reversible
error unless the error is harmful." Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome
of the proceedings. Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the
verdict. The burden of showing harmfulness normally rests with the complaining
party.
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted); id. (citing State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988) (holding that "appellant has the burden of
establishing that reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion'1).
The State has not met its burden of showing harmfulness. Assuming, arguendo,
that competency treatment for 90 days was required, the State has not established why
such an error was not sufficiently inconsequential in this particular case. Especially in
light of the forcefulness of the lower court's rulings, the State has not shown the
likelihood of a different outcome had such a 90 day period taken place. R 1047 (the court
found that after almost nine years of experience with White and "y e a r s of observation and
volumes of evidence," there was "no indication ... treatment would be beneficial, or that
restoration to competency is likely").
In fact, the court expressly stated that it did not "blindly" fail to consider the
commitment process. "Instead, I exercised my proper judicial role and considered the
entire restorative process described in § 77-15-6." Second Ruling, page 2 (emphasis in
original); R 1124. Its rulings were reasonable, statutorily cognizant, and not prejudicial.
Even if there had been a 90 day statutory treatment period, a different outcome was
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not likely then or now for a court with such a long-standing familiarity of the competency
issues surrounding Mr. White. Given the 15 year old nature of some of the allegations in
the case, R 1125, and the "eight-plus years this case has pended," R 1101, the trial court
already prospectively ruled that the 90 day treatment period would not have prompted a
different result:
I rendered the Judgment the State seeks to amend only AFTER weighing all
the factors clearly outlined in my ruling. I considered them along with defendant's
extensive history of noncompliance and the evidentiary issues raised by the age of
the case. ONLY THEN did I determine that the likelihood of the State obtaining
the remedy they seek on the pending allegations did not warrant the expenditure of
all the resources outlines in § 77-15-6. Therefore I dismissed the pending
allegations ONLY.
... [My ruling] does not preclude the State from screening and appropriately
pursuing more recent charges.

In fact, my ruling affords the State an opportunity to pursue more recent
charges, if appropriate, with fresher evidence, more accessible records, more
readily available witnesses, and negates the possibility of reversal on defendant's
180-day Detainer Motion from 2001.
Second Ruling, pages 2-4 (emphasis in original); R 1124-26. Indeed, if this Court
remands the case with an order allowing the 90 day restorative process, the State has not
shown that "the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines
our confidence" in Judge Boy den's First and Second Rulings. At best, this Court could
order a 90 day restorative process and if Judge Boy den's rulings still remained the same,
nothing statutorily would be different then than it is now except for the 90 day lapse of
time. Following such a 90 day process and the status quo of an incompetency
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determination, the State's recourse (both now and then) would be civil commitment
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(5)(c). Such a situation does not constitute
prejudicial error. Cf. State's Opening Brief, page 9 (the State's references to a one year
or eighteen month evaluation process are inapplicable to the court's 77-15-6(5)(c)
determination).
Again, since "the State has chosen to not appeal from the court's determination
that Defendant is incompetent[,]" State's Opening Brief, page 5, if the State's focus is on
treating or committing Mr. White, alternative means are available for such a course of
action. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(5)(c) ("If the court enters a finding pursuant to
Subsection (4)(c) ['incompetent to stand trial without a substantial probability that the
defendant may become competent in the foreseeable future'], the court shall order the
defendant released from the custody of the director unless the prosecutor informs the
court that commitment proceedings pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People
with Disabilities, or Title 62A, Chapter 15, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Act, will
be initiated").
The State is not precluded from filing more recent criminal non-support charges
"with fresher evidence, more accessible records, [and] more readily available
witnesses[.]" Second Ruling, page 4; R 1126. Even assuming, arguendo, error occurred,
the narrowness of the court's rulings and the State's decision to not appeal the finding of
incompetency would not change the outcome.
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is not requested.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully requested that the Court affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
The court's First and Second Ruling should be affirmed for any or all of the above-stated
reasons.
SUBMITTED this 15th day of March, 2010.

Ronald S. Fujino
Attorney for Mr. White

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I have caused the original and seven copies of the foregoing to
be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 15th day of March, 2010.
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5. Order for hearing — Stay of other proceedings -Examinations of defendant - Scope of examination and report.
(1) When a petition isfiledpursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of the defendant's
competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of the defendant's competency
pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which proceedings are pending shall stay all
proceedings. If the proceedings are in a court other than the district court in which the petition is
filed, the district court shall notify that court of the filing of the petition. The district court in
which the petition isfiledshall pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of incompetency. If a
petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to granting or denying the petition, hold
a limited hearing solely for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court
finds that the allegations of incompetency raise a bonafidedoubt as to the defendant's
competency to stand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental condition of the
person who is the subject of the petition.
(2)

(a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency hearing, the court may
order the Department of Human Services to examine the person and to report to the court
concerning the defendant's mental condition.
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health experts not involved in
the current treatment of the defendant.
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes apparent that the
defendant may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least one expert experienced
in mental retardation assessment shall evaluate the defendant. Upon appointment of the
experts, the petitioner or other party as directed by the court shall provide information and
materials to the examiners relevant to a determination of the defendant's competency and
shall provide copies of the charging document, arrest or incident reports pertaining to the
charged offense, known criminal history information, and known prior mental health
evaluations and treatments.

(d) The prosecuting and defense attorneys shall cooperate in providing the relevant
information and materials to the examiners, and the court may make the necessary orders
to provide the information listed in Subsection (2)(c) to the examiners. The court may
provide in its order for a competency examination of a defendant that custodians of
mental health records pertaining to the defendant shall provide those records to the
examiners without the need for consent of the defendant or further order of the court.
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the executive director of the
department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be retained in the same custody or status he was
in at the time the examination was ordered.
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report to the court consider
and address, in addition to any other factors determined to be relevant by the experts:
(a) the defendant's present capacity to:

(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against him;
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if
applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings against him;
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him;
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable;
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the nature and
quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel;
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered:
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's competency;
and
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect and
ability to participate in the proceedings.
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, the expert shall
indicate in the report:
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency;
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation and its relationship
to the factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency;
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to restore competency.
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an initial report to the court and the
prosecuting and defense attorneys within 30 days of the receipt of the court's order. The report
shall inform the court of the examiner's opinion concerning the competency of the defendant to
stand trial, or, in the alternative, the examiner may inform the court in writing that additional
time is needed to complete the report. If the examiner informs the court that additional time is
needed, the examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days to provide the report to the court and
counsel. The examiner must provide the report within 60 days from the receipt of the court's
order unless, for good cause shown, the court authorizes an additional period of time to complete

the examination and provide the report.
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall:
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation;
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used in the examination and the purpose
or purposes for each;
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on each issue referred
for examination by the court, and indicate specifically those issues, if any, on which the
expert could not give an opinion; and
(d) identify the sources of information used by the expert and present the basis for the
expert's clinical findings and opinions.
(8)

(a) Any statement made by the defendant in the course of any competency examination,
whether the examination is with or without the consent of the defendant, any testimony
by the expert based upon such statement, and any other fruits of the statement may not be
admitted in evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue
respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced evidence. The
evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a determination of the defendant's
competency.
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners should specifically advise the defendant
of the limits of confidentiality as provided under Subsection (8)(a).

(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for a mental hearing which shall be held
in not less thanfiveand not more than 15 days, unless the court enlarges the time for good cause.
Any person or organization directed by the department to conduct the examination may be
subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. If the experts are in conflict as to the competency of the
defendant, all experts should be called to testify at the hearing if reasonably available. The court
may call any examiner to testify at the hearing who is not called by the parties. If the court calls
an examiner, counsel for the parties may cross-examine the expert.
(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the court, by a preponderance of the evidence,
finds the person incompetent to proceed. The burden of proof is upon the proponent of
incompetency at the hearing. An adjudication of incompetency to proceed shall not operate as an
adjudication of incompetency to give informed consent for medical treatment or for any other
purpose, unless specifically set forth in the court order.
(11)

(a) If the courtfindsthe defendant incompetent to stand trial, its order shall contain
findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections (4)(a) and (b) of this section. The
order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6(1) which the court sends to the facility where
the defendant is committed or to the person who is responsible for assessing his progress

toward competency shall be provided contemporaneously with the transportation and
commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances require earlier
commitment in which case the court shall forward the order within five working days of
the order of transportation and commitment of the defendant.
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial shall be accompanied by:
(i) copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of
examination if not provided previously;
(ii) copies of any of the psychiatric, psychological, or social work reports
submitted to the court relative to the mental condition of the defendant; and
(iii) any other documents made available to the court by either the defense or the
prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's current or past mental condition.
(12) If the courtfindsit necessary to order the defendant transported prior to the completion of
findings and compilation of documents required under Subsection (11), the transportation and
commitment order delivering the defendant to the Utah State Hospital, or other mental health
facility as directed by the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his
designee, shall indicate that the defendant's commitment is based upon a finding of
incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall be accompanied by the
reports of any experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of examination. The executive
director of the Department of Human Services or his designee may refuse to accept a defendant
as a patient unless he is accompanied by a transportation and commitment order which is
accompanied by the reports.
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the court, the prosecuting and defense
attorneys shall provide information and materials relevant to the defendant's competency to the
facility where the defendant is committed or to the person responsible for assessing his progress
towards competency. In addition to any other materials, the prosecuting attorney shall provide:
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting affidavits or other documents used in
the determination of probable cause;
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency pertaining to the
charged offense; and
(c) information concerning the defendant's known criminal history.
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure compliance with this section.
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall not result in the dismissal of criminal charges.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6. Commitment on finding of incompetency to stand trial —
Subsequent hearings — Notice to prosecuting attorneys.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found to be incompetent
to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant committed to the custody of the executive
director of the Department of Human Services or his designee for the purpose of treatment
intended to restore the defendant to competency. The court may recommend but not order
placement of the defendant. The court may, however, order that the defendant be placed in a
secure setting rather than a nonsecure setting. The director or his designee shall designate the
specific placement of the defendant during the period of evaluation and treatment to restore
competency.
(2) The examiner or examiners designated by the executive director to assess the defendant's
progress toward competency may not be involved in the routine treatment of the defendant. The
examiner or examiners shall provide a full report to the court and prosecuting and defense
attorneys within 90 days of arrival of the defendant at the treating facility. If any examiner is
unable to complete the assessment within 90 days, that examiner shall provide to the court and
counsel a summary progress report which informs the court that additional time is necessary to
complete the assessment, in which case the examiner shall have up to an additional 90 days to
provide the full report. The full report shall assess:
(a) the facility's or program's capacity to provide appropriate treatment for the defendant;
(b) the nature of treatments provided to the defendant;
(c) what progress toward competency restoration has been made with respect to the
factors identified by the court in its initial order;
(d) the defendant's current level of mental disorder or mental retardation and need for
treatment, if any; and
(e) the likelihood of restoration of competency and the amount of time estimated to
achieve it.
(3) The court on its own motion or upon motion by either party or by the executive director may
appoint additional mental health examiners to examine the defendant and advise the court on his
current mental status and progress toward competency restoration.
(4) Upon receipt of the full report, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the defendant's
current status. At the hearing, the burden of proving that the defendant is competent is on the
proponent of competency. Following the hearing, the court shall determine by a preponderance of
evidence whether the defendant is:
(a) competent to stand trial;

(b) incompetent to stand trial with a substantial probability that the defendant may
become competent in the foreseeable future; or
(c) incompetent to stand trial without a substantial probability that the defendant may
become competent in the foreseeable future.
(5)

(a) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), the court shall proceed with
the trial or such other procedures as may be necessary to adjudicate the charges.
(b) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(b), the court may order that the
defendant remain committed to the custody of the executive director of the Department of
Human Services or his designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the
defendant to competency.
(c) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(c), the court shall order the
defendant released from the custody of the director unless the prosecutor informs the
court that commitment proceedings pursuant to Title 62 A, Chapter 5, Services to People
with Disabilities, or Title 62A, Chapter 15, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Act, will
be initiated. These commitment proceedings must be initiated within seven days after the
court's order entering the finding in Subsection (4)(c), unless the court enlarges the time
for good cause shown. The defendant may be ordered to remain in the custody of the
director until commitment proceedings have been concluded. If the defendant is
committed, the court which entered the order pursuant to Subsection (4)(c), shall be
notified by the director at least 10 days prior to any release of the committed person.

(6) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsection (5)(b), the court
shall hold a hearing one year following the recommitment.
(7) At the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), except for defendants charged with the crimes
listed in Subsection (8), a defendant who has not been restored to competency shall be ordered
released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as
provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(8) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder, murder, attempted murder,
manslaughter, or a first degree felony and the court determines that the defendant is making
reasonable progress towards restoration of competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to
Subsection (6), the court may order the defendant recommitted for a period not to exceed 18
months for the purpose of treatment to restore the defendant to competency with a mandatory
review hearing at the end of the 18-month period.
(9) Except for defendants charged with aggravated murder or murder, a defendant who has not
been restored to competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (8) shall be
ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the same
terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c).

(10) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder or murder and the court
determines that he is making reasonable progress towards restoration of competency at the time
of the mandatory review hearing held pursuant to Subsection (8), the court may order the
defendant recommitted for a period not to exceed 36 months for the purpose of treatment to
restore him to competency.
(11) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsection (10), the court
shall hold a hearing no later than at 18-month intervals following the recommitment for the
purpose of determining the defendant's competency status.
(12) A defendant who has not been restored to competency at the expiration of the additional
36-month commitment period ordered pursuant to Subsection (10) shall be ordered released or
temporarily detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as provided in
Subsection (5)(c).
(13) In no event may the maximum period of detention under this section exceed the maximum
period of incarceration which the defendant could receive if he were convicted of the charged
offense. This Subsection (13) does not preclude pursuing involuntary civil commitment nor does
it place any time limit on civil commitments.
(14) Neither release from a pretrial incompetency commitment under the provisions of this
section nor civil commitment requires dismissal of criminal charges. The court may retain
jurisdiction over the criminal case and may order periodic reviews to assess the defendant's
competency to stand trial.
(15) A defendant who is civilly committed pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People
with Disabilities, or Title 62A, Chapter 15, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Act, may still be
adjudicated competent to stand trial under this chapter.
(16) (a) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in this section, other than those
specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13), shall be a motion to compel the hearing, or
mandamus, but not release from detention or dismissal of the criminal charges.
(b) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12),
or (13) shall not be dismissal of the criminal charges.
(17) In cases in which the treatment of the defendant is precluded by court order for a period of
time, that time period may not be considered in computing time limitations under this section.
(18) At any time that the defendant becomes competent to stand trial, the clinical director of the
hospital or other facility or the executive director of the Department of Human Services shall
certify that fact to the court. The court shall conduct a hearing within 15 working days of the
receipt of the clinical director's or executive director's report, unless the court enlarges the time
for good cause.

(19) The court may order a hearing or rehearing at any time on its own motion or upon
recommendations of the clinical director of the hospital or other facility or the executive director
of the Department of Human Services.
(20) Notice of a hearing on competency to stand trial shall be given to the prosecuting attorney. If
the hearing is held in the county where the defendant is confined, notice shall also be given to the
prosecuting attorney for that county.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l.

Appeals — When proper.

(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution; or
(d) an order denying bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7).
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek discretionary
appellate review of any interlocutory order.
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony information following
a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a charge on the ground that the court's suppression of
evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case;
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest;
(d) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger;
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial
of a speedy trial;
(f) an order granting a new trial;
(g) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid;

(h) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending
prosecution;
(i) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for Execution,
that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed;
(j) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or
(k) an illegal sentence.
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek discretionary
appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy attaches.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction
or charge of afirstdegree felony or capital felony;

Utah R. Civ. P. 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that
on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amendfindingsof fact and conclusions of law or
make newfindingsand conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of
the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was preventedfromhaving a fair
trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been
induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he

could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision
(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is
based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after
such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court
may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

Utah R. Crim. P. 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its
own initiative or upon application of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of particulars
furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the
pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the impaneling or in
the proceedings relating to the grand jury;

(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable delay, or the court is
without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the information or indictment, or
there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further
prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect
to the custody of the defendant pending thefilingof new charges as the interest of justice may
require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial or
based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense
charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case if it is
compromised by the defendant and the injured party. The injured party shallfirstacknowledge
the compromise before the court or in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein
and entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense;
provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted when the misdemeanor is
committed by or upon a peace officer while in the performance of his duties, or riotously, or with
an intent to commit a felony.
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Third Judicial District
MAR 24 2009

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 011900818

Plaintiff,
vs.

Judge Ann Boyden

JAMES BENJAMIN WHITE,
Defendant.

Title 77, Chapter 15 of the Utah Code clearly provides that no
person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense.
It is an important and humane part of our law that recognizes it is
not right to prosecute someone for a crime, if that person does not
understand what is occurring throughout the entire procedure.
It is vital that everyone involved in this hearing understand that
a competency adjudication is a judicial determination.
It

differs

from

other

judicial

rulings

in

that

it

involves

consideration of mental health evaluations and clinical opinions.
it is not a clinical diagnosis.

But

In many cases, the mental health

examiners' opinions differ from each other, as well as from the ultimate
determination of the judge.

Any expert evaluation and opinion is an

important factor to be carefully considered, but it is not determinative.
It is the judge's non-delegable duty to look at all the relevant
evidence before her; including the case history, competency evaluations,
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observations of the defendant, written and oral communications from the
defendant, and other people's interactions with the defendant.

In an

inquiry into competency, the defendant is presumed to be competent unless
a preponderance of the evidence shows him to be incompetent.
Utah Code Ann., § 77-15-5, outlines the required process for
obtaining competency examinations. It provides that the defendant shall
be examined by

at least two mental health experts not involved with

defendant's current treatment. The evaluators' reports must address the
specific factors listed in § 77-15-5(4).
As is my practice, I have asked each attorney in this case to select
a qualified evaluator to examine the defendant's competency.
Plaintiff's counsel selected Dr. Mark Rindflesh and defendant's
counsel selected Dr. Golding.
The statute requires both the State and defendant cooperate in the
process. Both attorneys have fully cooperated.

Defendant has only

hesitantly and partially cooperated here.
Defendant claims to have submitted to an evaluation by Will Haghasi,
Ph.D.

I have received no reports at all from this therapist and he is

specifically excluded from conducting a competency evaluation because he
is involved with defendant's therapy.
Defendant did not
Rindflesh.

initially submit

to an evaluation with Dr.

He first sought to have me recused for ordering the
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evaluation, and sought an opinion from the appellate courts as to whether
he was required to comply with my Order to have the evaluations.
But, as Dr. Rindflesh describes it, he did present -- "as a somewhat
defensive man/' "offended that the competency evaluation was requested,"
and *no doubt presenting information with his own bias," —but he
presented for a single interview, February 19, 2009, and the evaluation
was completed.

I have studied this report at length.

I have received nothing from Dr. Golding.

It is my understanding

the defendant did not submit to that evaluation, as required,
Dr. Rindflesh opines that the defendant meets the clinical standard
for competency.

He lists no Axis I diagnosis, but does list Axis II

diagnosis of Personality Disorder, Nos, with aspects of narcissistic and
paranoid personality disorders.
Looking at all the evidence before me as a whole, I find that the
evidence of

(l) defendant's disjointed thought processes;

(2) his

distorted perceptions of both the judicial system and reality in general;
(3) his paranoid personality disorder; and (4) his narcissistic behavior
is abundant.
It is sufficient to meet the legal standard that defendant's mental
and thinking disorders significantly impede his ability to proceed to
trial.
Defendant's mental disabilities result in his inability to factually
or rationally understand proceedings against him.
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On January 18, 2001, the State Attorney General's Office filed a
third degree felony, criminal non-support

charge against defendant,

charging that from July 1994 through 2000, defendant failed to provide
support for his two minor daughters. A $10,000 bail was set based on the
probable cause statement.
On February 20, 2001, the Legal Defenders Office was appointed to
represent defendant. The defendant was in Colorado, but filed the first,
of what

would become many, pro

se

documents while represented

by

attorneys of record.
On July 7, 2001, the defendant was present in Utah and immediately
ordered released to Pretrial Supervised Release pending trial.
On August 16, 2001, a preliminary hearing was heard by Judge
Maughan, with John O'Connell, Jr., representing him. Judge Maughan found
probable cause to bind over defendant to this Court, as charged.
In the eight-plus years this case has pended, defendant has filed
hundreds of pages

of

rambling, pro se filings, and made numerous

objections in and out of court.

Never, in anv of these communications,

has the defendant ever addressed the legal issues charged; that is,
whether he provided support to his children.
In 2002, defendant was an inmate in a Colorado prison for an
independent Sex Assault on a Child felony.
pending case dismissed.

Pro se,

he moved to have this
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I denied defendant's 180-day detainer Motion for failure to meet
either the substantive or

procedural requirements of the Interstate

Agreement on Detainer statutes.
(I note here, simply because defendant has so frequently raised it,
that at the same time, the defendant filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss for
speedy trial issues with Judge Barrett*

This involved a separate case

with a different prosecuting agency, the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office.

At the hearing on this Motion, defendant was represented by

David Brown.

Contrary to what defendant repeatedly claims, even most

recently to Dr. Rindflesh, the Court did not dismiss this case because
of the defendant's actions or his attorney's.
defendant not guilty of the charge(s).
delay to the defendant.

The Court did not find

The Court even attributed some

But Judge Barrett did grant defendant's Motion

to Dismiss the case because the State had failed to actively prosecute
the

ca.se/)
Defendant never has understood how I could deny what he perceived

as the same Motion that another Judge granted.)
Defendant appealed my ruling.

That appeal was dismissed, because

my ruling was not a final Judgment on the case.
At that point, both this Court and several defense attorneys advised
defendant that he needed to proceed on to trial, so that he could get
that requisite final Judgment.

Then, if convicted, he could test the
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correctness of my 180-day detainer ruling in the appropriate appellate
court.
Rather than follow that legal and rational procedure, defendant
insisted on remaking the same Motion on the same argument in multiple
jurisdictions.
Meanwhile, defendant refuses to address the underlying criminal nonsupport charge that still pends. He makes virulent accusations that his
ex-wife lies about her income; her boyfriend/husband makes more money
than he does; they all live in a bigger house; and church and government
agencies adequately provide for his children.
These claims from the defendant are the very ones Dr. Rindflesh uses
to determine the defendant has an understanding of the charges against
him.

In fact, they are legally irrelevant and illustrate that defendant

does not understand the legal issues he faces.
The defendant demands extensive discovery into the boyfriend's and
ex-wife's finances. He cries foul when I will not order the prosecution
to provide documentation of the cash defendant claims to have given his
wife.
The papers defendant has filed in this case fill three volumes and
stack several inches high.

They do not include a single indication of

any support from defendant to his children.
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Everytime his attorneys advise him that these are not legal,
relevant or ethical avenues to pursue, he becomes angry because they will
not do as he instructs.

Everytime he receives an answer or ruling

contrary to what he wants, he demands another attorney, a different judge
or a new prosecutor.
He accepts no responsibility for his own conduct or obligations and
blames all his legal difficulties on others.

He claims court personnel

"steal his papers''; the attorneys are "pathological liars"; the judge and
prosecutor and defense counsel are "illegal bandits'' who conspire against
him.

He charges that a court commissioner instructed his clerks to

"discard" his files and then the appellate courts "looked a blind eye."
{All quotes cited verbatim from defendant's writings.)
Further evidence of defendant's inability to rationally understand
these proceedings is indicated in his conduct when he is given an answer
he doesn't like or information contrary to his perception of reality.
Rational behavior requires one to pursue this case through to trial and
appeal, so that any legitimate concerns and defenses can appropriately
be addressed in the court with correct jurisdiction.
Instead, the defendant remakes the same Motions repeatedly, demands
rehearings, files inflammatory and slanderous professional complaints,
and brings unfounded
jurisdiction.

lawsuits

in multiple

courts that are without
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Further evidence of defendant's distorted perception of the judicial
system is defendant's belief that his mere filing of a complaint means
an attorney "is in the process of being disbarred"; a party "has been
determined to be a pathological liar"; *one-hundred-mi11ion conflicts"
actually exist; or an "appeal has been perfected."

(All quotes cited

from defendant's filings in this case.)
Any attempt to advise him otherwise is met with a professional
complaint or lawsuit.
Defendant has no rational understanding of the punishment attached
to

a third degree

felony

criminal

non-support

provides for a prison sentence of 0-5 years.

conviction. The law

The more likely sentence

is a suspended incarceration with an opportunity to pay the owed support.
This case has not yet been able to get to trial, let alone reach
verdict, or any sentencing. Defendant's pretrial incarceration in this
case is limited to

(1) arrest on the initial warrant based on the

probable cause statement with release to Pretrial Supervision; and (2)
arrest on a $10,000 bench warrant to obtain him from Colorado in 2007.
Defendant posted bail and was released at that time.
Yet in filings as recent as January 2009, defendant lists in his
rights

"now being violated";

Continually be put under the extreme

hardship of being incarcerated and losing all that he has"; "being
subjected to the Court crazy 9-11 practices and policies"; "having all
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that he worked so hard to rebuild in Colorado totally lost"; "having the
State of Utah repeatedly try to kill him."
The defendant has no rational understanding that any attached
criminal penalty applies only to the person actually convicted.

The

defendant states to potential attorneys and to the Court that he is
having difficulty finding an attorney "who is willing to do even part of
the jail or prison time" if they lose.
That perception is so far removed from reality, that initially I
assumed

defendant

was

kidding.

But

the

defendant

repeats

frequently and earnestly, that I can no longer disregard it.

it

so

It is one

more indication that defendant has no rational understanding of the
potential punishments of the charged offense.
The second portion of a competency determination outlined in § 7715-2, Utah Code Ann., allows the Court to consider defendant's ability
to consult with counsel and participate in his defense with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.

Evidence of defendant's inability in

this area is even more voluminous than in the first portion.
On February 23, 2009, the last hearing here, defendant's most recent
appointed conflict counsel, Sue Denhardt, moved to withdraw.

As with

prior defense counsel, defendant had filed professional complaints and
lawsuits against her.
In addressing the Motion, I reminded defendant of my earlier ruling
that I would not appoint any more attorneys for him.

I advised him that
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he had the right to effective representation, but that he did not have
any right to personally and professionally attack every attorney who
enters an appearance in this case.

The defendant was outraged and

objected loudly, asserting, nShe is the only one!"
Given the factual case history docketed here, defendant's statement
was totally detached

from reality.

In defendant's March S, 2009,

Petition for an En Banc Rehearing, defendant modified his statement to
be:

"She is the only court-appointed counsel he could not get along

with."

Even so modified, the following detailed review of the court

docket shows defendant's perception has no basis in fact.
On February 20, 2001, at the first appearance hearing upon a filing
of this felony, Judge Reese appointed the Legal Defenders Office to
represent

defendant who was still in Colorado.

Clayton Simras was

assigned*
Fewer than five months later, on July
substitute

counsel,

given

problems

6,

defendant

2001, LDA asked to
was

having

with

his

attorney, and John O'Connell, Jr., was assigned.
Forty-two days later, on August 17, 2001, defendant filed a pro

se

Motion alleging incompetency of his attorneys.
On September 10, 2001, John Hill, the LDA Director, assigned Karen
Stain to address defendant's complaints.
Finally on October 15, 2 001, Robin Ljundberg acknowledged that
defendant's allegations of incompetence and malpractice are so extreme
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that the Legal Defenders Office can no longer represent him, and asked
that the entire office be conflicted off the case.
In a period of eight months, defendant went through four very fine
defense attorneys, each with a reputation for being able to work with
even exceptionally difficult clients.
On November 7, 2001, Edwin Wall was appointed as conflict counsel.
All of these appointments preceded defendant's incarceration in Colorado.
On April 1, 2003, Mr. Wall withdrew.

Once defendant returned to Utah,

and I denied his 180-day Detainer Motion to Dismiss, the case got back
on track towards trial.
November 5, 2007.

Ed Wall was reassigned as conflict counsel on

He stated he would try again to work with defendant,

but moved to withdraw six weeks later, advising the Court he was unable
to do what the defendant insisted of him.
6n January 14, 2008, I allowed Mr. Wall to withdraw and granted
defendant's request for time to hire his own attorney.

Defendant was

admonished this would delay trial.
Meanwhile, defendant filed several pro

se Motions, requested more

time and stated he was having difficulty hiring an attorney who would
agree to his requests.
On March 10, 2008, Barton Warren appeared with defendant. On April
7, 2008, Warren asked leave to withdraw, because he cannot rationally
deal with defendant, or help him understand his demands are
and unethical.

irrelevant

I granted Warren's Motion to Withdraw and appointed LDA

again.
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I advised defendant that a conflict appointment was likely, but

that this was the appropriate procedure to follow.
On April 16, 2008, Patrick Anderson, LDA, entered an appearance.
On May 2, 2 008, the expected conflict counsel Motion assigned Monte
Sleight.

Both attorneys appeared.

However, defendant had retained

Delbert Welker, who appeared with him.

I excused both Mr. Anderson and

Mr. Sleight.
On May 20, 2008, defendant was present with Mr. Welker.

I ruled on

Mr. White's Motions and ordered that the Court would no longer consider
any pro se Motions when defendant had an attorney of record.

The Motions

were so numerous, substantively non-sensible, and procedurally incorrect
that I was unable to manage them and still move the case forward.

I

ordered that the Attorney General was not required to respond to pro

se

Motions.
Defendant
attorney.

fully

disregarded

my

Order

to

In July 2008, Welker moved to withdraw.

proceed

through

his

On July 21, 2008, Mr.

Welker addressed in detail, on the record, the time and resources he had
expended on the case.

He stated defendant's requests were neither

rational or relevant, and he could no longer represent him.
I allowed Mr. Welker to withdraw, reappointed counsel, left all
trial and pretrial dates intact, and instructed defendant that this would
be the last attorney appointed for him. He needed to rationally work with
this attorney, or I would find he had effectively waived counsel.
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Heidi Buchi appeared from LDA with the immediate reassignment to
current conflict counsel, Susan Denhardt.
To my knowledge, defendant has filed complaints and lawsuits against
attorneys Warren, Welker and Denhardt; as well as the trial judge and
prosecutor.
In light of all the above, Mr. White's sworn statement that Ms.
Denhardt is the only attorney he has problems with is clear evidence that
he is significantly detached from reality.
Defendant also indicated to Dr. Rindflesh that there is an attorney
he can work with and Dr. Rindflesh feels this suggests the defendant can
be dealt with and represented adequately.

The attorney was not named in

the report and Dr. Rindflesh acknowledges that he was not able to
communicate with the attorney to get his perspective on the matter.
That attorney was identified at this hearing as Mr. David Brown.
Mr. Brown has stated on the record that he cannot legally take this case,
because he has represented the defendant's wife in related proceedings.
This is one more indicator that defendant does not have a reasonable
understanding of the legal and factual conflicts involved here.
This case history depicts more than a tactless, stubborn client.
The evidence is abundant that the defendant is so narcissistic that he
is unable to disclose to counsel any pertinent, relevant information that
would assist in this defense; or engage in any reasoned choice of legal
strategies and options.
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The defendant has no understanding of the adversary or advocacy
nature of these proceedings. He perceives defense attorneys, prosecutors
and judges as in a single conspiracy against him.
The defendant has no understanding of the procedural rules that
control this case at the pretrial, trial or appellate levels.

When the

Court or counsel attempt to direct him, he responds with vicious personal
and professional attacks.
Every single Motion, Complaint, lawsuit or appeal defendant has
filed regarding this case has been DENIED or DISMISSED as substantively
without merit or procedurally incorrect.
The defendant is beyond litigious or obstreperous.

The evidence

outlined in this ruling far exceeds the standard of preponderance.
Defendant is absolutely incompetent to proceed to trial on the
criminal non-support charge, dated 1994-2000.
Upon an adjudication that a defendant is not competent to proceed,
§ 77-15-6, Utah Code Ann., directs the procedure to restore competency.
It addresses cases where medication and treatment at the state Hospital
are likely to be beneficial.
It specifically states that defendants charged with Aggravated
Murder, Murder, Attempted Murder, Manslaughter and other first degree
felonies should have priority to these resources.
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Certainly the State has a real interest in prosecuting criminal nonsupport cases.

But as a third degree felony property charge, it carries

less weight.
There is no indication in this case that defendant would cooperate
with treatment outside the State Hospital, that treatment would be
beneficial, or that restoration to competency is likely.

There is no

reason to think any restoration could occur in a reasonable period of
time.
The controlling statute is clear that defendant's non-compliance is
not a basis for dismissal.

But my responsibility as Judge requires I

weigh all applicable factors.
The allegations in this case are nine to fifteen years old. The
evidence is sufficiently stale that neither party is likely to get a fair
trial.

The minor children are approaching majority.

There is no

likelihood that restitution ever would be paid, even if defendant were
tried and convicted.
There simply are not sufficient interests to justify expending any
more resources on this case or allowing it to proceed any further.
Based on my adjudication that defendant is not competent to proceed
further,

nor

likely

to

become

so

in

the

reasonable

future,

the

allegations of criminal non-support against James B. White from 1994-2000
in the State of Utah, are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 77-

I8a-1 provides that a defendant may appeal from an Order adjudicating
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defendant's competency to proceed further in a pending prosecution. My
dismissal with prejudice may moot that.
This adjudication is limited to the judicial determination provided
in § 77-15, Utah Code Ann,

Any collateral, substantive right that may

be affected by this adjudication is no more substantial than the
limitations already placed on defendant by virtue of his current status
as a convicted felon.
Dated this

fi^rf/day

of March, 2009.

ANN BOYDEN
-.
DISTRICT COURT OTlDGE
v-

*v4*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Ruling, to the following, this / ^ \

Ann Rozycki
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140814
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814
Susan ML Denhardt
Attorney for Defendant
341 S. Main Street, Suite 412
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Benjamin White
6325 W. Butterfield Parkway #1
Herriman, Utah 84096-3819

dav of March, 2009:

ADDENDUM C
"Ruling on State's Motion to Amend Judgment," dated April 14, 2009
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD »|n»^*Mr-ri*5nTf!^fuTy Clerk
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON STATE'S MOTION
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 011900818
vs.
Judge Ann Boyden

JAMES BENJAMIN WHITE,
Defendant.

The Court has reviewed the State's Motion to Amend Judgment, filed
April

2,

2009.

Because

the

Court's

adjudication

of

defendant's

competency to proceed on the 1994-2000 criminal non-support allegations
is so narrowly tailored, the State's arguments are not persuasive.
The

State

argues

I erred

in not

delaying

the March

23, 2009

competency hearing until Dr. Stephen Golding could review out-of-state
mental health records regarding the defendant.
claims

the

record

is unclear

whether

The State incorrectly

defendant

cooperated

in

that

evaluation.
The record is abundantly clear that defendant refused to timely
comply with my December and January Orders to cooperate in the evaluation
process, including refusal to participate in an evaluation with examiner
Golding. Therefore, Dr. Golding attempted to comply with the Court ordered evaluation by obtaining mental health information from sources
independent of the defendant. Dr. Golding was able to review many of the
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same documents the Court had considered.

I determined that five to seven

year old records from another state on another case would not provide
meaningful

assistance

in

my

adjudication

of defendant's

present

capabilities. Since I had extensive information on the issues otherwise,
I

determined

not

to

allow

defendant's

failure

to

comply

to

even

indirectly delay the proceedings any further.
The State argues that upon my adjudication that defendant was not
competent

to

proceed,

I

ignored

the

Utah

Code

Ann.,

§

77-15-6,

requirement to commit the defendant to the custody of the executive
director of the Department of Human Resources for treatment intended to
restore his competency.

The State feels that because I did not have the

benefit of these additional evaluations, my ruling was premature and
without sufficient basis.
Neither is correct.

As outlined in detail in both my oral and

written decisions from the March 23, 2009 hearing, this Court considered
years

of

observations

competency adjudication

and

volumes

of

evidence

before

reaching

the

The State does not contest that determination.

Upon that adjudication, I did not blindly or routinely proceed to
the initial next-step of committing defendant to the Department of Human
Resources, without any more consideration.
proper

judicial

role and

described in § 77-15-6

considered

Instead, I exercised my

the entire

restorative

process

I weighed the judicious expenditure of those

extensive resources against the totality of the circumstances in the
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the

factor

that

the

allegations in this case are 15 years old, with the attendant evidentiary
issues.
If I had made the commitment requested by the State, the evidence
is abundant that the defendant would not have complied with my order to
cooperate with the director of Human Resources any more than he has
complied with any of my previous orders.
Defendant's
compulsive

previous

services;

conduct

including

and

statements

police

power,

indicate

the most

incarceration,

State

Hospital commitment and involuntary medication, would likely be required
to obtain defendant's cooperation in an attempt to restore competency.
Even, if for the sake of argument, defendant were to freely cooperate and
be fully restored to competency within the initial six-month treatment
phase; I had already ruled that the reasonable time frame for this old
case to be fairly tried, is already past.

The State does not indicate

who would bear the cost of the full process they demand.

But it is

proper for the Court to determine the appropriateness of this use of
resources.
I rendered the Judgment the State seeks to amend only AFTER weighing
all the factors clearly outlined in my ruling.

I considered them along

with defendant's extensive history of noncompliance and the evidentiary
issues raised by the age of the case.

ONLY THEN did I determine that the

likelihood of the State obtaining the remedy they seek on the pending
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allegations did not warrant the expenditure of all the resources outlined
in § 77-15-6.

Therefore I dismissed the pending allegations ONLY.

The State rightly insists that both the State and victims have a
genuine

interest

in

pursuing

criminal

non-support

charges

I

acknowledged that real interest in the March 23rd hearing, and do so again
here

But my ruling explicitly applies to defendant's competency to

proceed on the 1994-2000 support only.

It does not preclude the State

from screening and appropriately pursuing more recent charges.
The law is clear that a competency adjudication applies only to the
present capabilities of defendant to proceed on pending charges.

It

specifically does NOT bestow a permanent status.
In fact, my ruling affords the State an opportunity to pursue more
recent charges, if appropriate, with fresher evidence, more accessible
records, more readily available witnesses, and negates the possibility
of reversal on defendant's 180-day Detainer Motion from 2001.
The State also argues that my ruling denies them any medical finding
necessary to support possible social security benefits the victims might
receive.
Again, I explicitly ruled that this is a judicial determination.
It is NOT a clinical diagnosis, and is NOT to be used for purposes
outside those outlined m

§ 77-15.

Such issues were not before me, and

are never properly before the trial judge, in a criminal case, making a
competency determination.

If the State seeks that type of medical
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finding, it must seek it in a straightforward, proper process, and not
use competency proceedings for a non-proper purpose.
My March 23, 2009 adjudication regarding defendant James Benjamin
White's present competency to proceed on the charge in the then-pending
Information was

carefully

specific

before

issues

and purposefully

me.

I had

tailored

abundant

to address

evidence

to

reach

the
my

conclusions, and the ruling specifically sets the scope and parameters
of the Judgment.
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment is DENIED.
Dated this

I \

day of April, 2009.

ANN BOYDEN
^^^
DISTRICT COURT JttDGE

I
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
James B. White file his own pro se Direct Criminal Appeals of the Trial court's
order dismissing one count of Criminal Non-support §77
, after conducting
invalid competency Proceeding proceedings. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Annotated §78A- 4103 ( _ ) (e) (West 2008) SEE
ADDENDA "A" (COPY OF JUDGE BOYDENS' ORDERS OF DISMISSAL

I

MR. WHITE SHOULD NOT BE COMMITTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTORY
PROVISIONS OR MR WHITE'S GUARANTEED STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

The Trail Court, and Judge Boyden were required as per the plain language of
Utah's Annotated Code §77-15-5 (2)(b) to obtain at least two Mental Health
evaluations, which provides: "(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two
mental health experts not involved in the current treatment of the defendant..."
In State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 778,783 (Utah App. 2007) this Appellate court
has held that when interpreting a statute, the appellate court looks first to its plain
language to determine its meaning. Only when it finds that a statute is ambiguous
does it look to other interpretive tools. While examining a Statute's plain
language, the appellate court does so under the presumption that the legislature
used each term advisedly. It is an elementary rule of construction that affect must
be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute. No clause,
sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant in the
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of
the Statute.
The appellate court's task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to
correct or revise then. When the words are clear, however incongruous they may
appear in policy application, the appellate court will interpret them as written,
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leaving to the legislature the task of making corrections when warranted.
Judge Boyden was not allowed to very from the Plain Language of the Statute
because it included the working SHALL, and was specifically designed to make
sure that at least two Psychological evaluations would be done and that they had to
be done by two separate psychologists who were not involved with the Defendant,
and from who's evaluations the Judge and all involved would have to rely upon.
The State's Statutory provisions were specifically designed to protect the Public
from Judges like Boyden who would not follow the trained licenced psychologists
evaluation report, and pretend to understand psychology better as was Mr. White's
case by issue their own unorthodox opinions instead.
Instead of following Utah's mandated Statutory Code, Trial Judge Boyden
illegally voided the Statutory Procedure for no apparent reason other then she
already had the State's Commentary Evaluation report provided to her and she
knew that it was most likely that the other mandated report would most likely be in
Mr. White favor because it would also have to be provided for by his defense
wherein it would be even more clear that Mr. White was in fact Competent to
Stand Trial; and for which would go against Judge Boyden's prejudice and Biased
plans to have Mr. White Determined to be incompetent.
The idea of course was that if Mr. White could legally be held to be found
incompetent then of course Judge Boyden herself would not look so bad to the
Judicial Conduct Commission where Mr. White also had a case (See No.09-3D049) pending under investigation from Mr. White allegations that Judge Boyden
had illegal instructed her own court clerk to remove from the District Court,
Official court filed document, of Mr. White's Speedy Trial Motions to Dismiss on
violation of Speedy Trial right. SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF MR.
WHITE'S JUDICIAL COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE BOYDEN)
Mr. White is requesting that this Appellate Court remand this case back to the
District Court, other then prejudiced Judge Boyden, to conduct proceedings that
are consistent with Utah Annotated Code Provision, because worse then the fact
that Judge Boyden did not seek to have the second evaluation done was the fact
that she did not follow the State's Own Evaluation recommendations issued by Dr.
Reindflesh's, because in his evaluation he clearly provided that Mr. White was
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totally competent. SEE APPENDIX "
COMPETENCY EVALUATION)

" (COPY OF DR RINDFLESH'S

In Judge Boy den's Final order (that was prepared under extreme prejudiceness
because she had been both sued in State and Federal Court for her illegal actions
of removing Mr. White's own pro se motions to dismiss on Violations of his
Speedy Trial Rights) she propagated the false belief that Mr. White did not have
the ability to fully and legally comprehend the legal system and penalties to be
imposed, when in fact he is totally competent, as per the State's own evaluation.
Further this Appellate court must completely over turn Judge Boyden's
unorthodox ruling because it is not in line with any other Statutory or
Constitutional ruling that have ever been issues in any District State or Federal
court, nor doe it agree in any way with that of the State's own Psychologist
Evaluation, which also provides that Mr. White is in fact totally Competent.
Mr. White dose in fact clearly understand the legal system and how they can
promise you one thing in a Plea Agreement but never in fact be required to uphold
their own promise, because in 1996 in the State of Colorado Mr. White was forced
under coercion and duress (of again being Jailed after he had already posted a
$5,000. bond) into taking a four year Deferred Sentence, only to do the 4 year
Sentence in the State of Utah, without being found in violation of that sentence; to
again then be sent to the Colorado Prison for an Additional Four years for no
crime committed.
Then in addition to not agreeing to a Sentence that would include being
subjected to a life time sentence to register every few month, he now also has to
pay an additional $100.00 a Year in Fees totaling more then $5,000.00
Further Judge Boyden's ruling providing that Mr. White was incompetent could
not be further from the truth because Mr. White clearly understands the American
Judicial System because he has personally taken four of his own Cases through
both the State of Colorado Appellate Courts and Federal District and Appellate
court and then through the United States Supreme court, which included filing
thousands of court legal pleadings, as well as he helped other prisoners file
numerous appeals.
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While in the Colorado Department of Corrections Prison system Mr. White
probably studied more law for four years and filed more petitions them most
Attorneys will ever file, and he studied hard enough to know that Judge Boyden did
not have any Jurisdiction to bring the case to trial in direct violation of this Rights to
a Speedy Trial, being more then Eight Years later, when he was available at all time
for the State to Extradite him back to the State of Utah years ago.
II. THE JUDGE BOYDEN, SUZAN DENHARDT AND THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY ANN ROZYCKI HELD THE COMPETENCY
HEARING ILLEGALLY AS PER STATE STATUTE.
Mr. White's Statutory and Constitutional rights of how the competency
evaluations were even ordered were also violated because Utah Annotated Code §7715-5 Provides that"(1) when a petition is filed pursuant to 77-15-3 raising the issues
of the defendant's competency to stand trail or when the court raises the issue of the
defendant's competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which proceedings
are pending shall stay all proceedings..." were violated because as per the District
court record it was Mr. White's Prejudiced Non-Defense Attorney Suzan Denhardt
who called the court and requested the December 8, 2008 Hearing and not on the
Court's own motion nor had Suzan Denhardt submitted the required petition herself
to the court as was required by the Statutory Competency Provisions. SEE
APPENDIX " " (COPY OF THE DISTRICT DOCKETING HISTORY
"SUSAN DENHARDT CALL CLERK'S OFFICE REQUEST HEARING" -)
Further since Mr. White's Prejudiced Non-Defense attorney Suzan denhardt had not
requested the Competency proceedings in a Petition as Pursuant §77-15-3 but rather
had just called the court house and Scheduled the Hearing (without giving Mr. White
any legal notice of the Hearing dates) and where it was never provided in the Official
Court record that the Judge had also not called for the Competency Hearing on her
own as was required pursuant to section §77-15-4 then Said December 8, 2008
Competency proceedings were not as pursuant to any of the State of Utah Law Code
Provision and therefore were also not valid.
Worse then all of that was the fast the since the proceedings was in fact
Competency Proceeding, then for Mr. White to not even be defended by any Attorney
Counsel was completely incorrect, because the very point of having the competency
proceeding were to protect the Mentally impaired for being prosecuted by the Court
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when they were not even able to comprehend the legal system as Judge Boyden had
illegally declared Mr. White to be.
What Mr. White means by the fact that he did not have any valid counsel was the
fact that his counsel had told the judge that she could not legally represent Mr. White
in any further proceedings, because she had stood before Mr. White's small claims
District Judge and sworn an oath to tell the truth and therein testified against Mr.
White in open court and therein became a direct conflict of interest between her and
Mr. White, and as per his Attorney privileges she could not legally defend his case
any longer, and that is why in the January 24,2008 Hearing she had put in her official
motion to withdraw, as Mr. White's counsel and was granted leave by the Judge.
By Judge Boyden's own Ruling of Mr. White's Competency Determinations she
also completely ruled against herself because by refusing to appoint Mr. White's
Case any Conflict Fee Competent Attorney counsel (and where Mr White was also
not allowed to provide any form of defense himself) then the proceeding were again
completely un-orthodox, illegal and unconstitutional and as such were also invalid.
III. THE PROSECUTION IS NOT ENTITLES TO FILE AN APPEAL
WHEN BY LAW THEY ARE ABLE TO RE- FILED CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT CHARGES TO INCLUDE A MORE CURRENT PERIOD
The State is not entitled to file a direct appeal because in the state of Utah the
charges of criminal non support are a continuing offense, in that as with Mr.
White's case once he is owing more then $10,000.the state is able to Re-filed the
same charges of Criminal Non-support to include a more recent time period.
{Citing the Utah's Criminal Non-Support Statute}
In Mr. White's Appeal Memorandum in Support of his appeal he has already
cited a Habeas Corpus Petition case in which the Utah State Supreme court held
that if the State's prosecution is able to Re-file the charges (as is the case in Mr.
White's) then they were not legally allowed to file their direct appeals.
SEE MR WHITE'S APPEAL MEMORANDUM IN CITED CASE
IV. (4) THE DECEMBER 8,2008 COMPETENCY HEARING WAS ALSO
ILLEGALLY BECAUSE JUDGE BOYDEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY ANN
ROZYCKI AND DEFENSE COUNSEL OF SUZAN DENHARDT ALL HAD
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A 100 MILLION DOLLAR PREJUDICENESS, AND THEREFORE HE
ALSO NOT REPRESENTED BY ANY COUNSEL OR PRESENT TO
OTHERWISE DEFEND HIMSELF
On December 8, 2008, the trial court stayed the proceedings and ordered a
competency evaluation. R. 663; which was clearly not valid because it was not
done as per Mr. White's Statuary and Constitutional Rights of Due process
because it was both not done in a court of Competent Jurisdiction, being that it
was not held in any court Room, nor was any official record taken, nor was Mr.
White present to defend himself, and where his Non-Defense counsel of Suzan
Denhardt was already legally prejudiced (being that Mr. White was suing Suzan in
the State Federal District Court for 100 million dollars) then Mr. White was not
provided with any valid defenses during the Competency Proceedings, and as such
the Competency Proceedings were illegally conducted and invalid as per Mr.
White's Guaranteed Defense Due Process Rights. SEE APPENDIX" "
(COPY OF FEDERAL COMPLAINT WITH SUZAN DENHARDT)
Trial Judge Boyden, and the District Attorney, were also baised and prejudiced
during the Competency Proceedings and should not have been allowed to remain
on the case because Mr. White had also sued them in Federal Court for 100
million dollars for prior damages caused to him when Judge Boyden illegally had
her court clerk remove Mr. White's Speedy Trial motionfromthe court's own
official file. SEE APPENDIX " " (ORIGINAL FEDERAL COMPLAINT)

V (5) JUDGE BOYDEN, ANN ROZYCKI, AND SUZAN DENHARDT
VOIDED MR. WHITE'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHEN THEY FAILED
TO PROVIDE MR WHITE WITH A COPY OF THE STATE'S
COMPETENCY EVALUATION OR ALLOW MR. WHITE TIME TO
READ THE EVALUATION PRIOR TO THE HEARING..
Suzan Denhardt Mr. White's Prejudice Non-Defense attorney, the Judge and the
District Attorney all voided Mr. White's Due Process rights to Court Access when
they also failed to provide Mr. White with a copy of the State's Competency
Evaluation (that clearly provided that Mr. White was totally competent to proceed
to trial) before the Commentary hearing, nor would Judge Boyden even allow Mr.
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White Just a few minutes to read the Report, so that he could otherwise Defend
himself when no Other unprejudiced defense was otherwise legally available.
SEE APPENDIX " * (TRANSCRIPT OF COMPETENCY HEARING)
VI (6) MR WHITE WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH COMPETENT
UNPREJUDICED COUNSEL WHILE AT THE COMPETENCY
HEARING, AND THEREFORE VOIDED ALL DUE PROCESS RIGHT.
The Competency hearing(s) were illegally because Mr. White was not
represented by any unprejudiced Counsel, where Mr. White had a United States
Federal District Court law suit pending against Suzan Denhardt in the amount of
$100 million Dollars, for otherwise failing to defend his valid Speedy Trial Rights.
SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF MR. WHITE'S FEDERAL DISTRICT
PETITION WHICH ADDED SUZAN DENHARDT TO THE SUIT)
On
2008 Mr. White had also taken his Non-Defense Counsel of Suzan
Denhardt through a Small Claims Court hearing and was in the active process of
suing her for damages done in the amount of $2,000.00 because she was a
pathological Liar and and had not given Mr. White any written of verbal notice of
the December 8,2008 hearing that was conducted off the record, and in chambers
only. SEE APPENDIX "
" (COPY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS ORDER
OF DISMISSAL)
Further because the proceeding were in fact Competency Proceedings then as
per Mr. White's Guaranteed State and Federal Due Process rights the Trial Judge
Boyden was required to provide Mr. White with both Competent and unprejudiced
Counsel and where Suzan Denhardt clearly had a 100 million Dollar Federal and
$2,000.00 State Small Claims Conflict of Interest, and therein was legally
prejudiced, then Mr. White was not represented at all by any valid counsel at the
time of the Ruling and therefore it was also not legally valid as such.

VII (7) MR WHITE ALSO SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES HUMAN SERVICES,
MENTAL HEALTH WHILE ON APPEAL BECAUSE HE HAD POSTED A
$15,000.00 BOND THAT ALLOWED HIM TO REMAIN FREE PENDING
APPELLATE STATE AND FEDERAL REVIEWS.
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Mr. White should not have been committed to the Department of Human
Service, where the only evaluation that was relied upon was one that was obtained
through the State's Psychologist, and who's report clearly provided that Mr. White
was totally Competent to stand trial, and where Mr. White had posted a $15,000.
Bond that allowed him to remain free while the matter was fully decided in the
District Court, and while on appeal through the State and Federal Appellate courts.
VII (8) JUDGE BOYDEN'S COMPETENCY RULING WAS ALSO
INCORRECTLY PROVIDED WHERE MR. WHITE HAD ALREADY BEEN
DETERMINED TO BE COMPETENT IN JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT'S
COURT DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD
Mr. White was also determined to be Competent to stand trial in June of 2008
which was also during the same time period, and of another Utah District Court
case that went before Honorable Judge William Barrette and that was properly
dismissed on June 20, 2008, because it was also determined that it had violated Mr.
White's Speedy Trial rights (being more then 7 years to trial), where non of the
delays could be attributed to Mr. White's fault. SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY

OF JUDGE BARRETT'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING)
Judge Boy den should also have followed precedence of Judge William Barrette's
competency and dismissal the case because in that case Judge Barrette had also
relied on the fact that it was the State of Colorado that Had officially contacted the
State of Utah Department of Corrections system, in a direct effort under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainer Act (IAD) and the Mandatory Disposition of
Detainer Act (MDA) to have the pending charges dealt with in a speedy manner;
but for which as was with that case the State of Utah declined to prosecute, therein
officially meeting the IAD and MDA requirements that the Charges be properly
disposed of for State of Utah's failure to prosecute within the 120 days of the MDA
and the 180 Days of the IAD Acts. SEE APPENDIX
(COPY OF
WILLIAM BARRETTE'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL)
XI (9) MR WHITE WAS ALSO WORKING FOR THE DIRECTOR OF
DAVIS COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH MARIAN WOMACK FOR
SEVERAL MONTH, WHO ALSO PROVIDED FOR HIS COMPETENCY
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Mr. White was also working for the State of Utah's Davis County Mental Health
director Marian and Don Womack during the time in question for several month,
who also wrote a favorable article for Mr. White on Angle's List.Com; which also
provides for Mr. White's competency in two ways being that she was happy to
employ Mr. White herself, and after several months of paying his wages, also wrote
an A Report of Mr. White's Personal Handyman services, and posted it on Angie's
List.com, for all to review. SEE APPENDIXES " ,
" (COPY OF
CHECKS PAID TO MR WHITE AND ANGIESLIST REPORT)
X (10) MR. WHITE WAS DENIED HIS SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS
Judge Boyden refused officially to enter a District Court Ruling on the merits of
Mr. White'sprose Motion to Dismiss on Violations of Mr. White's Speedy Trial
Rights. SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF MR. WHITE SPEEDY TRAIL
MOTION)
In May 20, 2008 Judge Boyden violated Mr. White's rights to Due Process Court
Access when she issued her order providing that Mr. White's Paid Attorney could
not file any Official Motion to Dismiss on Violation of his Speedy Trail Rights.
SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF JUDGE BOYDEN'S ORDER)
Judge Boyden voided Mr. White's Speedy Trial Due Process Rights when on
appeal in 2001 through 2004 she failed to appoint his case indigent attorney
Counsel, while on appeal of his Speedy Trial Rights. SEE APPENDIX " "
(COPY OF MR. WHITE'S SPEEDY TRIAL APPEALS 2001-2004)
Judge Boyden voided Mr. White's Speedy Trial Rights to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, when Mr. White had officially filed his State Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, also owing Mr. White $5,000.00 in penalty fees. SEE
APPENDIX " " (COPY OF MR. WHITE'S STATE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS)
Judge Boyden voided Mr. White State and Federal Statutory Mandatory Speedy
Disposition of detainer, where Mr. White had officially petitioned for a 120 day
Speedy Trial back in 2001, when Mr. White was in the Salt Lake County Jail from
June 20, 2001 through November 15, 2001; being more then 135 days of
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incarceration without a Statutory Speedy Trial back in 2001. SEE APPENDIX
"
" (COPY OF MR. WHITE'S (STATE 120 SPEEDY DISPOSITION
PETITION)
Mr. White was denied his rights to a Seedy Trial Rights by:
(A) Having a trail on charge brought back in 2001, but held more then eight
(16) years after the alleged crime(s) (1993-1996), and where non of the resulting
delays could be Actually attributed to any of Mr. White's actions;
(B) In Barker Vs. Wingo, and other similar Utah's Supreme court they have
held that a delay in excess of two year triggers an automatic presumption of
prejudiceness toward the State and for which calls for an automatic Hearing to
determine who actually caused the resulting delay, which the trail Judge Boyden
refused to do, as the State of Utah knew where Mr. White was at all times;
© Mr. White has physical proof that he had both requested that the case be
heard in a Speedy Manner and that his case was prejudiced by the delay in that he
was not able to provide any financial proof of his expenses to counter any income
that he had received that he would have otherwise been able to legally write off as
an expense, through a Certified Public Accountant;
(D) Mr. White had also requested that the State of Colorado contact the State
of Utah through his formal Inter State Agreement on Detainer Act and his
Mandatory Agreement on Detainer Act, which the State of Colorado had Official
done through the State of Utah, and therefore the Charges had to legally be
dismissed, because the State of Utah had then otherwise officially refused to bring
Mr. White to trial as was required by the two States Correctional Systems;
(E) All of Mr. White's Due process rights were violated by not having a
Speedy Trial where he was not able to provide any form of valid defenses on
charges that stemmed from a period back from 1993 through 1996 being more then
16 years, where he had no witnesses to call and no evidence available from the
Internal Revenue Services (being that they only go back for 10 years), and would
be heard before an Impartial out dated Jury Trial, as well as all his other
Guaranteed Due Process Rights would have been violated therein;
(F) Mr. White Criminal Non-Support case should have been dismissed as a
matter of precedence because his other Case that was not as old had already been
dismissed by Judge William Barrett, because, as was the same as this case none of
the resulting delay to bring that case to trial also could be attributed to Mr. White;
(G) Mr. White's Prejudiced Attorney Suzan DEnhardt could not legally
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represent Mr. White's defenses because she too (as was the case with Mr. White's
other counsel) had failed to defend Mr. White's Speedy Trial right wherein Mr.
White had added her to his Pending Federal District Court Case, which at that time
was pending in the State of Utah Federal District Court.
XI (11) MR WHITE WAS DENIED HIS VALID STATE FILED PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPS, OF DENIED SPEEDY TRAIL
Mr. White was denied his State and Federal rights to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and penalties that are assigned, when all involved continually
refused to hear his valid State and Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
properly providing that Mr. White was being illegally held in violation of his rights
to a Speedy Trail. SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF MR WHITE'S STATE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS)
Utah State Law code 77Clearly provides for a penalty of $5,000.
For each and all involved including the District Attorney, Defenses Attorneys and
Judge when as was the case with Mr. White they fail to have a Prompt Habeas
Corpus Hearing to determine whether or not Mr. White was being illegally
detained, in direct violation of his Speedy Trial Rights. SEE APPENDIX " "
(COPY OF MR. WHITE STATE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS)
Mr. White should have received an award amount of at least $5,000. From
each of the parties involved for refusing to acknowledge his valid file Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and is now again requesting to be paid the moneys now
still owing to him. SEE APPENDIX "_" (COPY OF MR WHITE'S CLAIM
FOR DAMAGES)
XII (12).

MR WHITE WAS DENIED AN UNPREJUDICED AND
UNBIASED TRAIL JUDGE AND DISTRICT ATTORNEY

In 2008 when the case was set for trial Mr. White was only appoint one state
appointed Counsel of Suzan Denhardt who was ineffective because she failed to
defend Mr. White's Speedy Trial Rights in any way and who then became
prejudiced counsel when Mr. White added her to his active pending State of Utah
Federal District Court Case back in 2008.
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Then Mr. White had also sued Judge Boyden in State Court for failing to
notify him of the December 8, 2008 hearing for the amount of $2,000.00 for
damages then also done to Mr. White, wherein Suzan, Ann the D A, and Judge
Boyden were also forced to defend herself in small claims court, as well as they
had gone head to head in Small Claims Court ordered Medication, therein they all
further became directly legally prejudiced, and could not be on Mr. White case.
SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF SMALL CLAIMS PAPERWORK)
Further because Mr. White had in fact forced all three of then (Suzan Denhardt,
the Trial Judge Ann Boyden and the District Attorney Ann Rozycki) to go before
the Utah's Small claims Trial Judge
, (for failing to provide him with
any notice of the December 8, 2008 said competency hearing, and was seeking
Small Claims damages in the amount of $2,000.00) then there is also no way that
any of the three could have legally held the competency Hearing after because they
were all legally prejudiced by the fact that they had in fact gone head to head
against Mr. White to answer for their actions done to Mr. White on Dec. 8 2008.
The District Attorney Ann Rozycki was further biased against Mr. White by
the fact that she had also again gone head with Mr. White when he had questioned
her directly while under oath in Mr. White's other Civil District Case Against his
previous counsel of Warren J. Barton, wherein again also creating additional legal
prejudiceness and biased toward Mr. White. SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF
WARREN BARTON'S COURT CASE)
Finally Because of these facts the competency proceedings that were in fact
conducted were conducted under extreme prejudiceness and from all three parties
and where the record clearly provides for the same of this prejudiceness, (because
Mr. White was not allowed any time to ready the State's evaluation report), then
the Hearing was conducted illegally and not of any valid form and must now also
be over turned as such.
XIII (13)

NO ONE SHALL BE JAILED FOR A DEBT OWING

John O'Connell Jr. Argued in his Memorandum in Support of his Motion to
dismiss provided that the State of Utah's Provision for Criminal non support was
not constitutional because it violated the State of Utah's Constitution that provided
that" No One Shall be Jailed for a Debt Owing." SEE APPENDIX " " (MR.
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WHITE'S MOTION THAT HAD COPY JOHN O'CONNELL'S
MEMORANDUM IN)
Mr. White also reargued these points through John O'Connell Jr's Brief, and for
which the Trial Judge Boyden also made her Official ruling in the May 20, 2008
Hearing that the Criminal Non-support provision was in fact constitutional, and for
which Mr. White also files this appeal.
SEE APPENDIX " " (COPY OF JUDGE BOYDEN
ORDER)
XIV (14) UTAH'S CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT STATUTORY
PROVISIONS ARE ALSO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
In John O'Connell Jr's October 21, 2001 Memorandum in Support of his motion
he argues that the state of Utah's Criminal Non- Support Statutes were
unconstitutionally vague because, as was the case with Mr. White's case they failed
to account as child support for any money and goods received from Mr. White like
$45,000.00 in rental income, because they were too vague.
Mr. White had reargued this same points through John O'Connell's brief and for
which he is now also appealing Judge Boyden's Official May 20,2008 Other
Ruling that the Criminal Non-Support Statute Vagueness was also in fact
constitutional. SEE APPENDIX " " COPY OF MR. WHITE'S MOTION
WITH COPY OF JOHN O'CONNELL JR'S MEMORANDUM)
XV (15) JUDGE ANN BOYDEN HAD LOST ALL JURISDICTION OVER
MR. WHITE'S CASE WHEN SHE REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO
CONDUCT A SPEEDY TRAIL HEARING TO DETERMINE WHO
ACTUALLY CAUSED THE EIGHT YEAR DELAYED TRIAL
Mr. White also believes that Judge Ann Boyden has lost all her Jurisdictions over
Mr. White's case when she repeatedly refused to have a Speedy Trial Rights
Hearing to determine who Actually caused the Resulting Eight Year delay to bring
the case to trial, because she was conducting a Trial in direct violation of both Mr.
White State and Federal Statutory and Constitutional rights as were upheld by both
the United States Supreme Court and the State of Utah's Supreme Court, and
therefore all proceedings including the Competency proceedings where then
illegally conducted and invalid as such.
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SEE STATE OF COLORADO CITING AND FEDERAL CITING
XVI. ALL OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED THROUGH FOUR
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS AND THREE FEDERAL CASES AND TWO
STATE CASES, NOT NOW LOCATED.

DATED THIS 12TH DAY OF MARCH 2010
James B. White
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 10th Day of October, 2009 that I deposited a
copy of the forgoing pro se Opening Brief, in the United States Mailing System,
Postage Prepaid and addressed to the Following:

James White
Utah Attorney General's Office
Appellate Attorney Ron FuJino

Dear Court Clerk's Office:
Please file this pro se OPENING BRIEF, which is timely filed as per Joan
Watt's 30 day request for an extension, and for me which I believe I am entitled to
file because of the following reasons:
MR WHITE'S PRESERVES HIS APPELLATE STATUTORY AND
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CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS THROUGH
FILING HIS OWN PRO SE OPENING BRIEF
Mr. White files his own opening brief and believes that he is proper
in doing so pro se, because even though his case has been appointed appellate
counsel of Ron FuJino, he now believes after talking to him that he will not be able
to adequately defend his Direct Appellate herein case because he does not have
access to all of Mr. White complete Files.
Mr. White's current Direct Criminal Appellate case stems from a time period
from 1993 through 2009, and deals with several cases from both of the States of
Utah and Colorado, including cases from both State's District and Federal courts
with thousands of pages of documentation, including Utah's Small Claims Court.
Mr. White also believes that his pro se Opening Brief is properly before this
court because Mr. White's herein Appellate case is also a direct Criminal Appeal,
and in order for him to proceed on appeal through the Federal District and Federal
Appellate and Supreme courts, all valid grounds for appeal that have also already
been ruled on by the Trial court must now also be preserved by being Properly and
adequately presented to both of the State court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
Finally Mr. White's will most likely not have appointed counsel through the
Federal District-Appellate and Supreme courts and as such Mr. White will again
have to defend them himself pro se as he did before back in July of 2006 when he
proceeded to the United State Supreme Court (Case Number 06-5470) and as such
he is now also making sure that as required by State and Federal Laws he has
properly preserved his Valid State appellate ground as now Petitioned pro se.
Sincerely

James B White Pro Se Appellant
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